Introduction
Legal pluralism is a notion that is both expansive and non-fixated; it can be legal theory, for it is discourse about the law; it is also jurisprudence, as it attempts to capture what the law is and what form or forms a substantive law should take. 1 In practice, legal pluralism denotes and emphasises the fact that alternatives coexist because they reflect the different considerations (eg, political, economic or social) and functions that a particular law is designed to attain. This article is about the judicial recognition of cross-border corporate insolvencies (CBIs) between Hong Kong and China (HK-China CBI) and how it can be sought and then granted through a number of ways: a special arrangement (the details of which will be expounded below); a memorandum of understanding (MoU) or private contracts (collectively referred to as "the alternatives"), depending on who is the applicant (ie, a judicial court or private litigants) lodging a petition for judicial assistance.
HK-China CBI matters belong to neither domestic law nor international law. In discerning the particular type of conflict of laws issues in HK-China CBI matters from those typically associated with private international law, the "regional conflict of law" theory was invented (further details below) for attaining this goal. In order to enforce insolvency judgments that have cross-border implications, a mutual judicial recognition mechanism is required. In the context of this article, CBI judgments refer to those made by the courts in Hong Kong or China which would be enforced in the counterparty's jurisdiction. For example, CBI judgments or orders made by the Hong Kong courts need to be recognised by the Chinese courts prior to being enforced in the counterparty jurisdiction (ie, China) and vice versa. Judicial assistance or recognition is usually sought in two circumstances: first, the courts in Hong Kong can seek cooperation from their counterparty courts in China in order to validate a claim raised by a creditor in Hong Kong against an insolvent debtor company in China; second, a private party in Hong Kong may want to obtain judicial recognition from a
Chinese court in order to enforce a favourable judgment made by the Hong Kong court; this is especially the case if the main assets of the debtor company are located in China.
Different circumstances call for different resolutions; the result is often that a particular alternative will be deployed in favour of others because it is designed for a specific desired aim of the concerned parties. For example, in seeking judicial assistance or recognition, acquiring a readily obtainable court order in a friendlier provincial court in China is often preferable to relying on a MoU. An enforcement action cannot always be efficiently carried out by deploying a MoU because it may fail to bring forth a timely resolution prior to the debtor company's assets being dissipated or grabbed by other creditors who are located in the same jurisdiction (eg, in China) as the debtor company and thus have easier access to the debtor company's assets and businesses.
Distinct advantages can be built into and associated with different alternatives, making their coexistence not only possible but also preferable -an important advantage and fundamental strength to legal pluralism. The opposite is also true: all alternatives available for deployment have limitations or disadvantages. Three exemplary alternatives can be qualified for demonstrating this point. First, a treaty is a formal judicial recognition mechanism which can warrant judicial assistance and recognition entitlements; however, entering into a bilateral treaty between Hong Kong and China for the very purpose of judicial assistance and recognition is impossible, given the political relationship between China and Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region (SAR) within China which is a subordinated region of its sovereign (China) and not an independent state which can otherwise be capacitated to sign a treaty. Under the Chinese politico-legal system, the level of a SAR government is akin to that of a provincial government. Hong Kong's political status will thus prevent it from signing a bilateral treaty with its sovereign (China) because a treaty must be Creditor Rights Systems. 7 It is predicted that the proposed judicial recognition mechanism for HK-China CBI cases, once in place, will have a long-term impact on Hong Kong and China.
In the Hong Kong-China politico-legal system, legal pluralism stems from and crosses over with path dependency, a theory that describes why "the apple does not fall far from the tree". Insights from the path dependency theory can be drawn to explain why Hong Kong adopted and continues to follow the British common law system even after it reverted to Chinese sovereignty and became the Hong Kong SAR (HKSAR) on 1 July 1997. The history of British colonial rule over Hong Kong from 1841 to 1997 (excluding the Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945) provides an opportunity to reflect on the common law tradition which guides and informs the legal system in Hong Kong -even in the modern day.
Given that context, legal pluralism, or more generally sociocultural pluralism, "provides a path-dependent pattern of institutional evolution". 8 History matters because "we cannot understand today's choices  without tracing the incremental evolution of institutions" 9 such as the legal system in general and the insolvency regime in particular in Hong Kong.
After Hong Kong became the HKSAR, the first formal judicial recognition mechanism for cross-border instances lay with the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition By way of extended discussion, this article intends to address the scholarly gap by analysing the institutional structure underlying the regional conflict of laws issue between Hong Kong and China and addressing the pluralistic alternatives in developing a formal judicial recognition mechanism for HK-China CBI matters. Given that institutions can be formal and informal, the mechanism's particular institutional form could be either (1) personnel of Chinese subsidiary companies is one important way to achieve this aim, although this would mean that administrative measures would be employed to achieve a result that a clearly stated insolvency procedure should bring forth as a matter of course and with legal certainty for all concerned parties. 14 Changing legal representatives has a certain innovative aspect to it, if it is viewed as a way to sidestepping the problem of having no formal judicial assistance and recognition mechanism for HK-China CBI cases. 15 For details, see Lee (n 13 above). If we opt to apply Tamanaha's legal pluralism analysis to HK-China CBI matters, since the regional conflict of laws originates from different insolvency laws that are applied respectively in Hong Kong and China, the combined factors of diversity (the advantage) and uncertainty (the disadvantage) can result in creating an incentive for opportunistic behaviour such as forum shopping. Given the purpose of shopping for court forums is to obtain a more favourable judgment from a court more friendly to them, this makes the concept of insolvency claims more vicarious, akin to a lottery game. Conversely, a formal judicial recognition mechanism can help achieve a result that a clearly stated insolvency procedure should bring forth as a matter of course and with legal certainty for all concerned parties.
Legal Pluralism
Elaborating further in the next section, the author will first discuss the alternatives available for providing solutions to the regional conflict of laws issue linked with HK-China CBI matters and then explain why a special arrangement, which is likely to be modelled after the formed in order to sustain and guarantee economic growth. To prevent the economy from suffering the effects of failed business enterprises, an insolvency regime should aim to provide a fair solution for the debtor company, its creditors and other stakeholders such as employees, shareholders, suppliers and even the investing public (if the debtor company is a listed public company). Second, market reform in China has led to a rapid expansion of the private sector -if the private enterprise's business went well, investors could profit from successful business investments; but if the business failed, one often finds that the insolvency of private enterprises in China is not a private matter at all. Once an insolvency petition is lodged with the Chinese court by either the debtor company or its creditor(s), the insolvency procedure will involve a team of officials and governmental departments which will take the helm of relevant insolvency proceedings.
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Since private parties cannot contract out insolvency law, a private party agreement on choice of jurisdiction cannot apply in HK-China CBI cases unless it is compatible with the operation of insolvency laws in both Hong Kong and China. This exposes the limit in relying on a private party agreement to enforce a favourable judgment, whereas formal judicial recognition affords a more radical resolution. Therefore, one of the main reasons for supporting pluralistic alternatives should be the ease with which judicial recognition or assistance can be obtained from the court that has the jurisdiction and authority to grant it.
Pluralistic alternatives often interact and intertwine with the institutions' functionalism. That is because institutions provide a legal or contractual structure for law enforcement purposes. formal mechanism such as a MoU or a special arrangement is put in place, it will be less likely subject to the political goodwill of concerned state departments in cementing the cooperation among them who had allowed themselves to be bound by a MoU or a special arrangement.
Legal pluralism provides a good way to evaluate normatively the interpretive choices of interested parties who may be entitled to rely on either one of the institutional alternatives:
a MoU or a special arrangement for HK-China CBI judicial recognition. The coexistence and competition between these two institutional alternatives suggest that legal pluralism can evolve from theories of political ordering. The political will required by the Supreme People's Court, Chinese central government and HKSAR regional government to avail the signing of a MoU or a special arrangement is precursory to the adoption of any formal mechanism for judicial recognition that focuses on HK-China CBI cases. In this regard, legal pluralism can be examined from a methodological angle in the context of adaptive efficient alternatives that constitute as institutional norms.
All institutions are invariably accompanied by transaction costs and therefore can be replaced by alternatives; 45 therefore the success of either a MoU or a special arrangement will depend on participation by its members (eg, the Supreme People's Court, designated Chinese
Courts to adjudicate on HK-China CBI cases, Hong Kong courts, etc.). Notwithstanding that, once a MoU or a special arrangement is harnessed with the status of a formal judicial recognition mechanism for HK-China CBI cases, the implementation will no longer be at the 
Conclusion
The problems of HK-China CBI issues have direct impact on the HKSAR's desire and ability in maintaining its reputation as a key international financial centre in the world while 46 North (n 3 above), p 87.
maintaining strong economic ties with China. The HK-China CBI judicial recognition mechanism should be made available for companies and insolvency practitioners in the HKSAR and China so as to simplify as well as unify the insolvency procedures in both jurisdictions. Judicial recognition lies at the heart of CBI disputes because they concern failing or failed debtor companies whose creditors, assets and/or place of incorporation are located in different jurisdictions. Without judicial recognition, a party seeking to enforce a CBI judgment made by a Hong Kong court against a counterparty in China must initiate separate insolvency proceedings in China. The dangers of duplicated law suits are not merely wasted judicial resources, time and costs; without judicial recognition, similarly situated creditors may be awarded different judgments by different courts, creating an incentive for forum shopping by creditors.
If a formal mechanism can be established for mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments or orders made by either the Hong Kong or Chinese courts on HK-China CBI matters, not only will the courts and insolvency practitioners in Hong Kong and China benefit, but the international scholar community and government policy makers will also benefit from the dissemination of insights and experiences gained from the study and practice of law in this specialised area. HK-China CBI matters have strong economic implication for both Hong Kong and China and, as such, the issue warrants a close study of all legal options that will help cement the commercial engagements between Hong Kong and China.
